Breaking Research Funded by Cebiz
“The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks” (PDF) by Roberto Cominaetti, José R. Correa, and Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
Network flow and the benefits and limitations of coordination between competitors.
“Order in Product Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field Experiments” (doc) by Jonathan Levav, Mark Heitmann, Andreas Herrmann, and Sheena S. Iyengar
The effects of depletion in arousal capacity and its effects on consumer decision-making are studied in experiments involving customization of products.
Atomic network games are fit to the Stackelberg game framework, where players with market power are leaders. A heuristic that approximates the leader’s optimal strategy is examined.
“Eliciting Coordination With Rebates” (PDF) by Patrick Maillé and Nicolás E. Stier-MosesThis research studies a model of using rebates in network routing games. An equilibrium is characterized between rebate cost and the efficiency of the model.
“The Psychology of Versioning” (doc) by Andrew D. Gershoff, Ran Kivetz, and Anat Keinan
Versioning is a practice of marketing less functional models of a product for a lower price, sometimes by disabling aspects of a fully functional model. This article examines negative perceptions towards versioning, and points out what causes negative reactions to be lessened.
